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Abstract
The 1998 reform of the Italian retail trade sector delegated to the regional
governments the regulation of entry of large retail shops. We use the local variation in
regulation to determine the effects of entry barriers on firm performance for a
representative sample of medium and large retail outlets. Using a diff-in-diff approach, we
find that entry barriers are associated with substantially higher profit margins and
substantially lower productivity of incumbent firms. We also find that liberalizing entry
has a positive effect on  investment in ICT, which the recent literature has shown to be the
main driver of the remarkable sectoral productivity growth in the US. Finally, in the most
liberal regions yearly inflation in the CPI component “food and beverages” was
approximately half a percentage point lower than in the other regions: higher productivity
coupled with lower margins resulted in lower consumer prices.
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1
Liberalization is arguably the most strongly advocated policy to improve economic per-
formance, especially in continental Europe. From the labor market, attention has progress-
ively shifted to product markets (Blanchard & Giavazzi 2003, Alesina, Ardagna, Nicoletti &
Schiantarelli 2005), particularly for services, where substantial barriers to competition are
still in place. Indeed, there is a widespread consensus that anti-competitive regulation is the
main cause of the US-Europe diﬀerence in productivity growth in the service sector in the
recent years.
2
Notwithstanding this emphasis on liberalization policies, robust quantitative evidence
on the eﬀects of liberalization is still lacking. A series of studies point to a positive eﬀect of
liberalization on performance. However, most of them are based on cross-country compar-
isons with qualitative indicators of regulation (Baily 1993, Nicoletti & Scarpetta 2003, van
Ark, Monnikhof & Mulder 1999), which makes it diﬃcult to quantify properly the costs of
barriers to competition. Moreover, cross-country studies are plagued by omitted variable
problems: for example, countries with more regulated product markets also tend to have
more regulated labor and ﬁnancial markets. They also face serious endogeneity and reverse
causality issues: countries whose ﬁr m sh a v ep a r t i c u l a r l yl o wp r o d u c t i v i t ym i g h ti m p o s ea
more stringent regulation to shelter them from competition.
We consider one sector in one country: retail trade in Italy.
3 Although losing in
generality, this allows us to tackle the problems mentioned above. Moreover, diﬀerences in
productivity growth between the US and Europe have been highest in retail trade, which
alone explains a large fraction of the total gap (Gordon 2004, van Ark, Inklaar & McGuckin
2002). Understanding the sources of such diﬀerences for that sector is therefore of interest
1 We thank Giovanni Seri of Istat for helping us with the System of Company Accounts (Sistema dei conti
delle impresa) and Alberto Alesina, David Card, Luigi Guiso, Francesca Lotti and Marcello Pagnini for useful
comments. The views expressed here are our own and do not necessarily reﬂect those of the Bank of Italy.
2 Already in the early 1990s, Baily (1993) claimed that the higher degree of liberalization is a major factor
behind the higher labor productivity of services in the US. In particular, restrictions to competition “... can
prevent the most eﬃcient producers from entering an industry or from expanding. It can also slow down the
diﬀusion of innovations and allow managers to operate with excess labor ...”.
3 In this respect, our paper is closer to Bertrand & Kramarz (2002), who consider the eﬀects of entry
barriers in the French retail trade sector. Diﬀerently from us, they focus on employment.4
in itself, beyond the general lesson on regulatory barriers.
T h ec a s eo fI t a l yo ﬀers a unique opportunity to study the eﬀects of regulation. The
retail trade sector, characterized by the prevalence of traditional small shops, underwent a
major regulatory change in 1998, when a law was issued to modernize it. A central feature of
the new law is the delegation to local authorities the power to regulate the entry of medium
and large shops. Contrary to the stated objectives, many regions have used that power
to raise substantial entry barriers. Seventeen out of twenty regions established stringent
ceilings to the ﬂoor space that could be authorized for entry or expansion of large shops.
We use (the negative of) such ceilings, normalized for local population, as the measure of
the entry barrier: the lower the ceiling, the more restrictive the regulation of entry. Being
predetermined, this indicator does not share the endogeneity problem of actual entry, which
crucially depends on the attractiveness of the local market.
We study how entry barriers inﬂuence the performance of medium to large stores at the
local level. The ﬁrm data come from the “System of Company Accounts”, a representative
survey run by Istat, the National Institute for Statistics. We restrict the analysis to ﬁrms
already in the market in the year the regulation came into eﬀect as, due to the survey
design, there is not enough information to assess the performance of new shops. We ﬁrst
analyze the eﬀects of entry barriers on proﬁt margins and productivity; we then move on
to investigate the source of productivity diﬀerences, considering whether, as suggested by
the literature (Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griﬃth & Howitt 2005), competition increases
investment in ICT, the main source of innovation in the sector.
4 Finally, we also study
whether diﬀerences in barriers translate into diﬀerences in consumer prices, as lower margins
and higher productivity would imply.
The eﬀects of the entry barriers are estimated using a diﬀ-in-diﬀ approach, that is
comparing performance at the local level before and after 2000, the year in which local
regulations came into eﬀect. This controls for ﬁxed local conditions. We also control for the
initial level of ﬂoor space over population to account for the possibility that new admissible
ﬂoor space is related to existing ﬂoor space, and, through a full set of year dummies, we
4 Indeed, the US-Europe comparisons mentioned above point to the diﬀerent rates of ICT adoption as the
main driver of productivity diﬀerences.5
control for overall trends in productivity.
We ﬁnd that entry barriers play a substantial role in explaining local performance.
According to the regression estimates, the elasticity of proﬁt margins to admissible ﬂoor
space over population is -14%, a very sizable eﬀect. The elasticity of productivity is 5%.
To better appreciate the implications, an area moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile
of the ﬂoor space distribution would record a drop in proﬁtm a r g i no f2 1 %a n da ni n c r e a s e
in productivity of 7.5%. These results are robust to a number of checks. In particular,
we show that entry barriers are not correlated with predetermined trends in productivity:
when running the same regression in the period before the inception of the law, we ﬁnd zero
correlation between barriers and performance. Moreover, entry barriers in retail trade have
no eﬀects on performance in the “Hotels and Restaurants" and “Other Non Professional
Services" sectors, which are the most similar to the retail trade one. This excludes the
possibility that they are proxying for generally less favorable legislation for business activity.
We also ﬁnd that increased competition increases the propensity to invest in ICT,
even if the eﬀect is signiﬁcant only when comparing the three regions without pre-set limits
against all the others. Moreover, contrary to the diﬀuse concern that deregulation might hurt
workers, we ﬁnd no eﬀect of entry barriers on wages. Finally, consistently with lower margins
and higher productivity, prices of goods in the “food and beverages” retail trade sub-sector
—the retail trade segment where the presence of large stores is highest— recorded an average
yearly inﬂation half a percentage point higher in the regions with barriers, compared to the
three regions without any pre-set limit.
The implications of our analysis are clear. Entry barriers produce one category of
winners and many losers. The winners are incumbents, which enjoy substantially higher
proﬁts. On the other side, economic eﬃciency is reduced and consumers are harmed through
a less eﬃcient distribution system and higher prices. Our results on wages, together with
those of Viviano (2006) for Italy and Bertrand & Kramarz (2002) for France, showing that
barriers have a detrimental eﬀect on job creation, imply that workers too are harmed by
regulation.
The rest of the pap er is organized as f ol lows. Section 2 descri b e s the 1998 law t hat
re organi ze d t he re gul a ti on of t he s ec t o r. Se ct ion 3 describ es the empirical approach and the6
data. Results are discussed in Section 4, whil e t he robustness checks are rep orted i n Section
5. The last section concludes.
2. The local retail trade regulation
The Italian trade sector is currently regulated by the Bersani Law (Decreto legislativo
n. 114/1998), issued in March 1998. The law was drafted to increase competition and
favor the modernization of the Italian retail trade sector, by reducing entry barriers and
administrative formalities. Following a tendency to decentralize decision-making that began
in the early 1990s, the law delegates substantial regulatory power to local authorities. This
makes the case of Italy interesting to study, as local legislation induced signiﬁcant variations
in regulation within a single country, with a high degree of homogeneity in other institutional
features.
Local governments are responsible for shop opening hours, night openings, promotional
activities and so on. Arguably, the most important aspect is the entry or enlargement of
large stores. We will focus the analysis on precisely this aspect, as entry barriers are the
most eﬀective instrument to restrict competition (Djankov, La Porta & Lopez-de Silanes
2001, Klapper, Laeven & Rajan 2004). Before the Bersani Law, opening small and large
outlets alike required a permit from the town council.
5 The Bersani Law deﬁned three types
of establishments: (1) small (also called neighborhood shops): up to 150 square meters; (2)
medium-sized: between 150 and 1,500 square meters; and (3) large establishments: over
1,500 square meters. In cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants, the thresholds are raised
respectively to 250 and 2,500 square meters.
The law eliminated authorization for small establishments, which are now only required
to notify their opening to the town council on the principle “silence signiﬁes assent”. The
council has 60 days to stop the new opening, but only for a given set of reasons. Instead,
a system of prior authorization holds for medium and large stores. Medium stores have to
5 The ﬁrst national regulation concerning the retail trade sector was the “Regio decreto legge no. 2174”
of 1926. This law laid down that any commercial opening had to be authorized by the town council, which
could approve or reject applications at its discretion. To increase transparency in the approval procedure,
in 1971 a new national law (Legge n. 476/1971) established that the authorities had to set explicit rules
for the location of new establishments, according to a town plan. Local plans regulated the opening of new
retail trade establishments until the Bersani Law came into eﬀect.7
apply to the town council as before the Bersani Law. Large store openings or enlargements
are regulated at the regional level. Each regional government must draw up a commercial
zoning plan for the development of large stores, consistently with environmental and urban
considerations. The Italian regional governments also set up regional boards, called “Confer-
enza dei servizi”, to process applications and verify that openings comply with the regional
zoning plan.
6 The Italian regional governments were obliged to draw up their local commer-
cial regulations by April 1999. In the meantime, the law blocked any pending authorization
procedures so that no new permits could be issued in the absence of a regional zoning plan.
7
There is a growing consensus that, contrary to its objectives, the consequences of the
Bersani Law were in most cases to strengthen entry barriers for large stores (see ISAE (2002)
for evidence and a review of the literature on this topic). First, no regional government met
the deadline for issuing the regional regulation. As a consequence, from the inception of
the Bersani Law in March 1998 until roughly the ﬁrst part of 2000, no new opening permits
were issued. Second, only three regions, Piedmont, Emilia Romagna and Marche, set general
guidelines for the application procedure without any prior limit on the new admissible ﬂoor
space for new stores. The remaining 17 regions set stringent ceilings for entry, following
a roughly similar approach. They divided the region into areas, often coinciding with the
administrative province, and for each of them they established the maximum ﬂoor space that
could be authorized during the next 3-5 years.
8 Entry ceilings can be used to construct ideal
measures of entry restrictions. First, actual entry crucially depends on the attractiveness of
the local market, in addition to entry restrictions. Moreover, since it is predetermined, this
variable also avoids the problems associated with other variables used in the literature, such
as the share of rejected applications (Bertrand & Kramarz 2002).
9
6 The regional governments are also competent to determine the composition of the regional zoning boards.
Most of them are composed of regional and municipal coun c i l l o r s ,a sw e l la sc o n s u m e r s ’a n ds m a l ls h o p k e e p -
ers’ representatives.
7 During this period, large store openings were possible only if the corresponding permit was issued before
March 1998.
8 Some regions explicitly set the time limit for their regional zoning plans, others did not indicate a period
of validity for the limits. Nowhere were limits revised before 2003, which covers the time period of this study.
9 Applications depend on the applicant’s assessment of the likelihood of being accepted, so that few
applications might be submitted in regions where they are more likely to be rejected, making this indicator
problematic.8
We examined each regional regulation and computed the maximum ﬂoor space that can
be authorized for entry or large store expansion in each province.
10 To account for the size
of the market, we take the ratio of the admissible ﬂoor space to the population (henceforth,
AFSP) in the province and use (the negative of) this variable as our preferred measure of
entry barrier: the lower the ratio, the higher the entry restrictions.
Table 1 reports the total admissible ﬂoor space per 1,000 inhabitants, aggregated at the
level of the regions for clarity of exposition.
11 Regions are ranked in decreasing order of AFSP
and divided into those with no prior ceilings, those below and those above the median value,
a split that we will use in the regressions. The table also reports the total large store surface
(per 1,000 inhabitants) in 1999, i.e. when the regional regulations came into eﬀect, and the
total AFSP (the sum of the two indicators). There are very sizable diﬀerences in AFSP.
Among the 17 regions that set the ceilings, the range is from over 100 square meters per
1000 inhabitants for the most liberal regions (Molise, Val d’Aosta and Sicily) to below 15 for
the most restrictive ones (Calabria and Basilicata). Moreover, there is no clear (negative)
correlation between the existing ﬂoor space and the restrictions imposed by the regional
boards. For example, in the three regions that did not impose any prior limit (Piedmont,
Marche and Emilia Romagna), the ratio between existing ﬂoor space and population was
higher than the national average. Similarly, some regions with a low stock of large stores
surface (e.g. Campania, Basilicata and Sardinia) imposed high entry barriers (low AFSP).
12
T h i si n d i c a t e st h a to u rm e a s u r eo fb a r r i e r sd o e sn o ts i m p l yr e ﬂect the catching up of regions
that lag behind in terms of development of large stores.
10 Some regional regulations express the total ﬂoor space increase as a percentage of existing ﬂoor space.
To derive our measure of entry barriers we multiplied this increase by the total ﬂoor space reported in the
census conducted by Italian Ministry of Industry and Trade. This records the aggregate existing ﬂoor space,
the aggregate number of large outlets and the total number of employees by province since 1999. Two
regions, Puglia and Calabria, set the maximum number of stores that could be licensed in each area. In
order to get a measure of the corresponding ﬂoor space we multiplied the number of openings allowed by the
average surface of the large stores existing in a given area. Moreover, in order to get a province indicator,
when two or more areas are located in the same province, the corresponding admissible ﬂoor space is the
total. When an area extends over two provinces, the admissible ﬂoor space is assigned to the province whose
territory includes the largest number of towns in the area.
11 The Table does not report data on Friuli Venezia Giulia, since the regional authorities issued the local
regulation in 2005, a period not covered by our analysis.
12 The correlation coeﬃcient between existing surface and total admissible surface is -.12.9
Figure 1 gives a graphical representation of the AFSP for the Italian provinces. (De-
tailed data in AFSP are reported in Table A1 in the Appendix.) While the three regions with
no pre-set ceilings are all in the North and Center, among the others there is no clear geo-
graphical pattern: for example, much of the North-East has fairly stringent limits, while the
contrary occurs in Sicily. If we consider the total ﬂoor space over population (existing ﬂoor
space before the Bersani Law plus AFSP), reported in Figure 2, we instead see that a clear
North-South divide emerges: southern regions have lower levels of large store development,
indicating a lag in the modernization of the sector.
3. Empirical Model and Data
We now turn to the description of the empirical approach used to determine the eﬀects
of entry barriers. We start by describing the empirical model and then move on to the data.
3.1 The model
We estimate the eﬀects of entry barriers using a diﬀ-in-diﬀ approach. Entry barriers
represent the treatment; their eﬀect is estimated by comparing changes in performance indic-
ators (proﬁt margins, productivity, prices) for treated areas with those of non-treated areas
(i.e. those without predetermined maximum ﬂoor space) before and after the reform that
came into eﬀect in 2000. By considering the within-province variation before and after 2000,
we control for area-speciﬁc factors: provinces might have characteristics that systematically
inﬂuence ﬁrms’ performance, such as population density or public infrastructure; by compar-
ing regions with diﬀerent levels of regulation at the same point in time, we also control for
aggregate factors, such as any general trend in productivity. The approach is implemented
with the following regression:
(1) yijt = α0 + α1D ∗ BARj + α2xijt + Yt + Rj + Si + εijt
where yijt is the relevant outcome for ﬁrm i in area j in year t, D is a dummy equal to 1
for the years 2000-2002, BARj are the indicators of entry barriers of area j following the
inception of the Bersani Law, xijt are time-variant ﬁrm characteristics, Yt, Rj and Si are
year, area (103 administrative provinces) and 5 retail trade sub-sector dummies (Ateco at
3 digits) respectively; εijt is an error term. The coeﬃcient α1 captures the eﬀect of entry10
barriers on yijt. Common trends are accounted for by year dummies; province dummies
control for ﬁxed local attributes.
In addition to ﬁxed local attributes and time trends, this approach is ﬂexible enough
to allow for further controls. Entry barriers might be correlated with diﬀerent trends in
ﬁrms’ performance, which would invalidate the causal interpretation of α1 in terms of entry
r e g u l a t i o n .W ec a np r o v i d ee v i d e n c et os u p p o r tt h ev a l i d i t yo ft h i si d e n t i ﬁcation assumption
against correlated diﬀerences in trends. If the level of barriers is correlated with unobservable
factors also determining the trend of yijt, one would reasonably expect that these factors
inﬂuenced ﬁrms’ performance even before the local inception of the Bersani Law, i.e. before
2000. Thus, we run regressions such as 1 also for the period 1993-1997, where D is now a
dummy equal to 1 for the years 1995-1997 and 0 otherwise. In this regression α1 is a measure
of correlation of entry barrier and diﬀerences in trends observed before the inception of the
Bersani Law. Thus, a test for α1 =0can be interpreted as a test for the lack of correlation
between the choices of policy-makers after 2000 and past diﬀerences in trends.
However, one may also argue that entry barriers may be endogenous not only to past
trends in yijt, but also to other contemporaneous economic factors diﬀerent from retail trade
regulation. For example, regional boards that pass more stringent entry regulations might
generally adopt a legislation that is less conducive to economic growth. In this case α1
is not only a measure of the eﬀects of sector-speciﬁc entry barriers, since it also captures
these unobserved factors. We can again provide evidence for supporting our identiﬁcation
assumption. Following Bertrand & Kramarz (2002), we run regression 1 for ﬁrms belonging
to other similar sectors, such as hotels and restaurants and other non-professional services.
An estimate of α1 not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero would indicate that our measure of
entry barriers is not capturing some overall correlated eﬀects, as it only correlates with
outcomes in retail trade.
3.2 Data
The measure of entry barriers has b een describ e d at l engt h i n Section 2; i t i s based on
the AFSP at the province level. We ﬁrst use two dummies to distinguish between provinces
with no limit (the excluded group) and those with limits below and above the median, com-
puted for provinces with limits. We then directly include the log of AFSP, whose coeﬃcient11
is readily interpretable as an elasticity. For the regions with no limits, we set the indicator to
zero and include a dummy, whose coeﬃcient captures the eﬀect of not imposing any pre-set
ceiling on entry.
Data on ﬁrms are derived from the Italian survey “System of Company Accounts”
(Sistema dei conti delle imprese), conducted every year since 1992 by the Italian Institute
for Statistics (Istat). The survey is conducted according to EU Regulation 58/97 (“Structural
Business Statistics”, SBS) and provides information on many aspects of ﬁrms’ activity. The
b a s i cs a m p l eu n i t sa r eﬁrms that entered the market at least one year before the reference
period. The sampling procedure divides ﬁr m si n t ot w og r o u p sa c c o r d i n gt oag i v e ns i z e
threshold: all ﬁrms with a number of employees above the threshold are included in the
sample; ﬁrms below the threshold are randomly selected and not followed over time. The
sample is stratiﬁed by region, sector and employment size.
From 1993 to 1997 the threshold was 20 employees; in 1998 it was increased to 100
employees. This change in the sample design, as well as changes in the survey questionnaire,
prevents full comparability of information over time. Moreover, for reasons of conﬁdentiality,
Istat does not allow access to the data on ﬁrms with more than 100 employees from 1998
onwards. We therefore use data on ﬁrms with no more than 100 employees for the period
1998-2002.
13 More precisely, we have selected all retail trade ﬁrms (Ateco 52
14)b o r nb e f o r e
2000, i.e. ﬁrms already operating when entry barriers were set up, for a total of more
than 300 observations each year. We have excluded entrants after the reform because, up
to 2002, only 11 ﬁrms born after 2000 are present in the survey, making it hard to assess
the contribution of entrants. Moreover, it is well known that, due to start-up costs, time-to-
build and selection eﬀects, ﬁrms’ productivity right after entry is generally lower than that of
incumbents (Foster, Haltiwanger & Krizan 2002), as full productive potential is realized only
after a few years . We therefore restrict the analysis to incumbents, leaving the consideration
of the direct eﬀects of entry to future work, when a longer time series for entrants will be
available.
13 The total sample size of the survey amounts to about 50,000 observations. The response rate is around
40%.
14 Excluding Ateco 5231 “Dispensing chemists”, 5232 “Retail sales of medical and orthopedic goods” and
Ateco 5250-5274, i.e. retail sales of tobacco, second-hand goods and repairs. Shops in these sub-sectors are
typically small. We have also excluded retail sales activities not carried out in stores.12
The survey reports the number of employees, hours worked, labor costs, sales, invest-
ments, hardware and software expenditure and the administrative province where the main
branch of the ﬁrm is located. Unfortunately, information is not available on either the num-
ber of establishments per ﬁrm (as well as other plant-level information) or the retail ﬂoor
space. However, ﬁrms are required to report the number of employees working in estab-
lishments located in regions other than where the main branch is located. To minimize
geographical misplacement, we selected only the ﬁrms with at least 50% of the workforce
employed in the region of the main branch.
According to the Ministry of Industry and Trade (see footnote 10), average employ-
ment in stores deﬁned as “large" is 24, with a standard deviation of 8. We selected ﬁrms
with at least 16 employees, most likely to be subject to the entry regulation. We instead ex-
cluded small ﬁrms because the Bersani Law also changed their regulation, liberalizing entry
throughout the country, without regional variation. This change of system is likely to have
independent eﬀects on small ﬁrms, making their inclusion in the analysis questionable.
15 In
any case, the estimati on exercises presented in Section 4 have also b een carried out f or di f-
ferent thresholds (ﬁrms larger than 10 employees, ﬁr m sl a r g e rt h a n2 0e m p l o y e e s )w i t hn o
relevant eﬀects on results. The ﬁnal sample amounts to more than 1,600 ﬁrms. Only 8% of
them have more than 50% of the workforce employed in regions other than the region where
the main establishment is located. The number of employees working in the same region as
the main branch amounts on average to more than 70%. We end up with a total of 1,576
ﬁrm-year observations, one-third related to the pre-reform period and around 300 to regions
with no pre-set constraints.
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regressions. Proﬁt
margins are deﬁned as the ratio between gross operating surplus and sales. Note that, in
line with the interpretation that regulation has on average become more stringent since the
introduction of the law, proﬁt margins have been substantially higher for the total sample
in the post-reform period. Sales are commonly used as a proxy of value added in retail trade
15 T h e r ea r eo t h e rr e a s o n st oc h o o s et h e1 6e m p l o y e et h r eshold. First, employment protection legislation
applies to diﬀerent degrees to ﬁrms below the 16 employee threshold. Schivardi & Torrini (2005) show that
the threshold does induce some discontinuities in ﬁrms’ behavior. Moreover, small, family ﬁrms are likely to
have less clean balance sheet information and to use more unreported work (such as family help or irregular
workers), making the computation of proﬁt margins and productivity less reliable.13
(see e.g. Foster et al. 2002). Real and nominal sales per hour worked are used as a measure
of retail trade labor productivity. Real sales are derived using the regional consumer price
indexes, produced each month by Istat since 1996 for each regional administrative capital
and for the following groups of goods: (1) food and beverages; (2) clothing; (3) household
equipment. More precisely, we have divided ﬁrms into the same 3 groups according to the
type of good sold (and derived from their Ateco classiﬁcation) and deﬂated ﬁrms’ nominal
sales by the yearly average of the corresponding regional consumer price indexes.
16 ICT
investment is measured by the probability that a ﬁrm has positive expenditure in hardware
and software. Hourly wages are derived as the sum of wages and salaries divided by total
hours worked.
We also study the eﬀects of barriers on the monthly “food and beverages” price index,
using the same price series described above. This price index strictly depends on develop-
ments in the retail trade sector; moreover, in Italy large outlets are relatively more numerous
in the “food and beverages” sub-sector. For example, according to the System of Company
Accounts data, in 1998 the share of employees in ﬁrms with more than 16 workers was equal
to 40% of total employment in the “food and beverages” sub-sector and to 14% in “clothing”
and “household equipment”. The share of nominal sales in total sales of ﬁrms with more
than 16 employees was equal to 60% in the “food and beverages” sub-sector and to 27%
in the “clothing” and “household equipment” sub-sectors. Thus, in the latter sectors, the
contribution of large stores to prices is likely to be less important.
4. Results
In this section we analyze the eﬀects of entry barriers on proﬁt margins, productivity,
investment in ICT, wages and prices.
17 We regress these variables on the measure of entry
b a r r i e r sa f t e r2 0 0 0a n do ny e a r ,p r o v i n c ea n ds u b - s e c t o rd u m m i e s . A sﬁrm control, we
include size, measured by the number of employees. Larger ﬁrms tend to have lower proﬁt
16 The categories (1) food and beverages; (2) clothing; (3) household equipment do not fully coincide with
the Ateco 3 digit classiﬁcation used for model (1). The categories are used only in order to obtain a suitable
price index for ﬁrms’ sales.
17 For Friuli Venezia Giulia the AFSP is conventionally set equal to the lower bound of the AFSP distri-
bution. See also footnote 1114
margins, higher productivity and greater propensity to invest in ICT. By controlling for size,
therefore, we are isolating the direct eﬀects of entry barriers on incumbent performance, net
of any market structure variation induced by the diﬀerent degree of liberalization. Given
that liberalizing the entry of large stores will most likely result in an increase in average size,
our results can be seen as a lower bound of the total eﬀects of barriers.
4.1 Proﬁtm a r g i n s
The most likely eﬀect of an increase in competition is a reduction in proﬁtm a r g i n s .I f
our measure of entry barriers is actually capturing variations in competitive pressures, we
should ﬁnd that proﬁt margins are lower for ﬁrms located in provinces with a higher increase
in admissible ﬂoor space over resident population. And this is exactly what we ﬁnd. Table
3 reports the results for the proﬁt margin regression. The dependent variable is the log of
the gross operating surplus over sales at the level of the ﬁrm.
In the ﬁrst column we separate the provinces between high, low and no constraints
(the excluded category). We ﬁnd that the ﬁrms in high constraint provinces have on aver-
age 39% higher margins than unconstrained ones (signiﬁcant at the 10% level), while the
values are smaller for low constraint provinces and not statistically signiﬁcant. Not surpris-
ingly, we also ﬁnd that size is negatively correlated with proﬁt margins; larger stores have
lower intermediation margins. The elasticity is sizable, around 20%, and very stable across
speciﬁcations.
In column 2 we introduce the log of the AFSP. The estimates imply large and statist-
ically signiﬁcant eﬀects. Firms in provinces with no pre-set limits recorded an average drop
in proﬁt margins of 63%, compared with those in other provinces. The elasticity of proﬁt
margins to the AFSP is -14%, signiﬁcant at 1%. To give a better appreciation of the eﬀect,
moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the AFSP distribution would reduce margins
by 21%.
As argued above, one possibility is that the AFSP is correlated with the pre-existing
local conditions of the sector, particularly in terms of existing ﬂoor space. While we have
shown that this does not seem to be the case, to further exclude this possibility, in the last
column we also include the log of the existing ﬂoor space over the population in 2000, i.e.15
a tt h et i m eo ft h er e f o r m .T h ee ﬀect of this variable is insigniﬁcant and all other coeﬃcients
are unchanged, conﬁrming that pre-existing conditions are not a source of distortion of our
results.
4.2 Productivity
We measure labor productivity as real sales per hours worked. The problem with
measuring productivity is that the diﬀerences in the proﬁt margins outlined above should
translate also into diﬀerences in prices, an issue that we will investigate later. In fact, if the
degree of liberalization is negatively correlated with price changes, then using a common price
deﬂator will introduce a spurious negative correlation between real sales and liberalization.
To overcome this problem, we use the regional deﬂators described in Section 3.2.
The regression results are reported in Table 4. With two dummies for low and high
constraint provinces, we obtain a coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 10% for the high ones: productivity
growth is almost 15% lower than in those with no constraints, a very large eﬀect. The eﬀect of
ﬁrm size is positive: the elasticity of sales per hours worked to employment is approximately
9%, indicating that large stores have higher labor productivity, a well-known fact in the
literature.
Next, we introduce the AFSP (column 2). Results are again clear cut: the dummy
coeﬃcient is 0.2 (with a standard error of 0.1), indicating that provinces without limits
recorded on average 20% higher productivity growth. The elasticity to AFSP is around 5%
and signiﬁcant at 5%. Moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the distribution would
increase productivity by 7.5%.
Finally, we include the initial level of the ﬂoor space over population. The estimated
coeﬃcients are basically unchanged, again indicating that our results are not driven by some
form of spurious correlation with the initial level of ﬂoor space per inhabitants. Diﬀerently
from the proﬁt margin regressions, the coeﬃcient of the initial level is positive and signiﬁcant
at 10%. This is a further indication that competition fosters productivity growth.
We have repeated the exercise using nominal sales as the dependent variable. Results
are very similar to those obtained with regional price deﬂators, indicating that the price
diﬀerences, if any, are not large enough to have a substantial inﬂuence on the productivity16
results.
4.3 ICT Investment
Why does competition increase productivity? Along with the traditional channels,
based on the idea that market power generates production ineﬃciencies (Leibenstein 1966),
competition may foster innovation and, through this, productivity growth of incumbents,
as found for example by Aghion, Blundell, Griﬃth, Howitt & Prantl (2005). In the case
of retail trade, process (as opposed to product) innovation is the main determinant of pro-
ductivity growth. This implies that ICT ivestment should be a fundamental determinant
of productivity growth, as such technologies allow logistics, inventory management etc. to
be rationalized. For example, van Ark et al. (2002) attribute the substantial diﬀerences in
productivity growth in retail trade between the US and Europe mainly to the diﬀerent rates
of ICT adoption. In turn, these could be due to the fact that entry restrictions slow down
t h er a t eo fd i ﬀusion of new technologies among incumbents, which face a lower risk of lagging
behind more eﬃcient entrants.
We address this issue by using the probability of having non-zero expenditure on ICT.
18
The results of the probit regressions are shown in Table 5, where we report the marginal
eﬀects. We ﬁnd that, in areas with no pre-set limits, the probability of having non-zero
expenditure on ICT was 27% higher than elsewhere, with no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the
low and high barrier provinces. This indicates that entry barriers can have strong negative
consequences on the rate of adoption of new technologies and on the pace of restructuring that
goes with it according to the literature (Caroli & Van Reenen 2001, Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson
& Hitt 2002).
19 When we introduce the increase in the ﬂoor space over population variable,
we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient is positive but not statistically diﬀerent from zero. One possible
interpretation is that, contrary to proﬁts and productivity, the eﬀects of competition on
ICT diﬀusion does not follow monotonically the increase in the AFSP. Indeed, diﬀusion
18 We have also experimented with ICT expenditure over sales, ﬁnding similar results.
19 Alesina et al. (2005) study deregulation in the transportation, communication and utilities sectors and
ﬁnd that it is associated with a spur in capital accumulation, particularly following entry liberalization. The
beneﬁcial eﬀects of removing entry barriers for a modern eﬃcient organization of supply is also found by
Viviano (2006), who shows that more liberal entry regulation has been accompanied by the diﬀusion of chain
stores.17
processes tend to be characterized by non-linear logistic shapes (Jovanovic & MacDonald
1994). Finally, and not surprisingly, ﬁrm size strongly increases the probability of ICT
investment, as found for example by Fabiani, Schivardi & Trento (2005) for a sample of
Italian manufacturing ﬁrms.
4.4 Wages
The eﬀects of entry on wages are ambiguous from a theoretical point of view. On
one side, more competition could lead to a reduction in wages, if workers share the rents
deriving from market power; on the other, the increase in labor demand and the higher
productivity that follows liberalization could increase wages. In Table 6 we report the results
of a regression where the dependent variable is the log of the nominal hourly wage. We ﬁnd
no systematic relation between entry barriers and wages: if anything, areas with higher
barriers have lower wages. We repeated the analysis separately for clerks and production
workers, ﬁnding similar results.
The evidence on wages indicates that, at the least, employees do not suﬀer from liber-
alization in terms of lower compensation. Needless to say, this analysis is very preliminary
and requires further work; in particular, being based on average wages at the level of the
ﬁrms,
20 it does not take into account workers’ characteristics. Nonetheless, it suggests that
the eﬀects of liberalization on wages are likely to be at best second order.
4.5 Prices
A natural conclusion of the previous analysis concerns prices. In fact, consumers should
enjoy lower prices because of both the decrease in proﬁt margins and the productivity in-
crease. Ideally, one would need store level prices, such as those coming from scanner data;
unfortunately, we do not have this type of information. As an alternative, we use the com-
ponent of the CPI for “food and beverages”. As mentioned in Section 3.2, these data are
available for each regional administrative capital, a level of geographical aggregation coarser
that the entry barrier measure, which is computed for provinces. They are monthly data
from 1996 to June 2004. This price series is longer than that of ﬁr m sa n de n a b l e su st o
20 For example, Neumark, Zhang & Ciccarella (2005) claim that the entry of the Wal-Mart chain in an area
has a negative eﬀect on compensations.18
extend the analysis until 2004 and to control for pre-existing diﬀerences in trends before the
retail trade reform of 1998, i.e. in 1996-1997. Of course, the price of goods depends on the
whole production chain; however, according to the System of Company Accounts data, in
the “food and beverages” sub-sector in 1998 proﬁt margins of wholesalers were 8%, while on
average they were around 20% for retail trade ﬁrms, suggesting more room for a decline in
margins in this sub-sector. Moreover, to the extent that the other components of the pro-
duction chain are tradable, changes should be common across areas: for example, producer
prices of food should have little local variability, as such goods are traded on an integrated
market. Variations in ﬁnal prices are therefore probably due to the contribution of the retail
trade sector.
The results reported in Table 7 lend some support to the view that liberalization has
a negative impact on prices. We ﬁnd that low-constraint regions recorded a price increase
almost 1% higher than the no-constraint regions. Surprisingly, the eﬀect is smaller and not
signiﬁcant for the high constraint regions; similarly, the regressions with the continuous in-
dicator give inconclusive results, possible because the higher level of geographical aggregation
of the price data introduces substantial measurement error in the regressions.
In ﬁgure 3 we report the estimates for high and low constraint regions interacted with
year dummies for each year from 2000 to 2004. This allows us to study the dynamics of
the price eﬀects of barriers. For the low constraint dummy, the eﬀect is already apparent in
2001 and extremely stable: in each year, prices increased by half a percentage point more
than in the no-constraint regions. For the high constraint dummy, the eﬀect is positive and
signiﬁcant only starting in 2003; however, it increases faster, and in 2004 the diﬀerence with
the unconstrained regions is the same as that for the low constrained ones, and equal to
almost 2%. This suggests that the ﬁnding of no overall eﬀect for the high constrained areas
and for the continuous indicator in Table 7 might be due to some initial diﬀerence in the
response of the various regions that tends to be overruled as time goes by and the eﬀect
cumulates.
21 Overall, this evidence indicates that entry barriers translate into non-trivially
21 It is also plausible that large store entries started aﬀecting prices from the time of their opening and not
from the time since entry barriers where set up. According to conversations with the regional representatives
at some regional boards, on average the opening occurs 6-8 months after the authorization if the commercial
building already exists, otherwise it takes on average between 1 and 2 years. Since in many Italian regions
the ﬁrst authorizations were issued in 2000, it is reasonable to assume that new openings occurred from 200119
higher prices for ﬁnal consumers.
22
5. Robustness checks
This section addresses two alternative explanations of our results. First, we control for
the possibility that entry barriers are correlated with the growth of proﬁts or productivity;
second, we check whether our liberalization measure is proxying for some other, more general,
local policy. For the sake of brevity and data constraints,
23 we only perform the analysis for
proﬁt margins and productivity.
5.1 Checking for diﬀerences in the underlying trends
Using local dummies, our framework controls for the possibility that barriers are cor-
related with the levels of performance. One could still argue that the same possibility
also applies to changes: for example, areas where proﬁts are growing faster may have more
resources to devote to lobbying local authorities and therefore obtain a higher level of pro-
tection. To control for this possibility, we repeat our regressions for the period before the
introduction of the law, i.e. the 1993-1997. If our indicators are capturing diﬀerences in
trends among areas, we should ﬁnd that, when running the same regressions for the period
before the law was passed, the entry barrier coeﬃcients should still be signiﬁcant.
As mentioned in Section 3.2, from 1993 to 1997 the sample design of the System
of Company Accounts survey included all ﬁr m sw i t hm o r et h a n2 0e m p l o y e e sa n do n l ya
representative sub-sample of smaller ﬁrms. Moreover, before 1998, the data only indicated
the region where ﬁrms were located and not the province. Therefore, we derive a regional
indicator of entry barriers, equal to the sum of the admissible ﬂoor space in each province
divided by the regional population (as in Table 1). The ﬁnal sample size, comprising ﬁrms
with more than 16 employees, amounts to 9,501 observations.
onwards. This might explain why diﬀerences in price developments are statistically signiﬁcant from 2001
onwards.
22 Similar conclusions on the relation between competition and price changes are reached by Gaiotti & Lippi
(2004) in their study of the eﬀects of the changeover to the euro on the prices of restaurants.
23 Data on ICT expenditure are not collected before 1998. Data on regional price indices are not available
before 1996.20
The results are reported in Table 8 for proﬁt margins and 9 for productivity.
24 We split
the period 1993-1997 in two, 1993-1994 and 1995-1997, and check for correlated diﬀerences
in trends before the Bersani Law. Standard errors are clustered by region. Results are
clear cut: the entry barrier indicators are not signiﬁcantly correlated either to proﬁts or to
productivity changes in the pre-reform period, indicating that entry barriers have actually
induced a change in the trends rather than being correlated with some pre-existing underlying
trends.
5.2 Other sectors
A second possibility is that our results are driven by some omitted variables captur-
ing a more general attitude of local governments towards business activity. Consider for
example the case of a region with a very pro-market approach to the local economy. Such a
region might undertake a series of policies that stimulate the economic activity in general,
in addition to low entry barriers in retail trade. In this case, the entry barrier indicator may
be proxying for a full set of economic policies. This is limited by the fact that most of the
economic policy decisions are taken at the central level; however, in recent years regions have
constantly gained areas of inﬂuence, so that this possibility cannot be excluded a priori. We
directly tackle this issue empirically, controlling for any correlation between entry barriers
in retail trade and performance in other relatively similar sectors. If entry barriers in retail
trade are capturing more general policies, then we would expect them to be correlated with
performance also in other similar sectors, even if these sectors are not directly inﬂuenced by
the barriers.
We have chosen the two service sectors most similar to retail trade, which should
respond in a similar way to general policies: hotels and restaurants (Ateco 551-554) and other
low wage service sectors (Ateco 747-748: cleaning, packaging, call centers). For consistency,
we have selected ﬁrms with at least 16 employees (but experimented with other thresholds,
ﬁn d i n gn od i ﬀerences). Table 10 reports the results for the proﬁt margin regressions for
our two preferred speciﬁcations (Model 1 and 2). No coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant
and signs are often the opposite of those of the original regressions. Table 11 repeats the
same exercise for productivity. In this case, we ﬁnd one signiﬁcant coeﬃc i e n tf o rt h el o w
24 Given that data on local prices are not available before 1996, we use nominal sales to measure productivity.21
wage sectors, but with the wrong sign: high entry barriers in retail trade are associated with
higher productivity. All other coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant.
Overall, these results indicate that proﬁt margins and productivity in these similar
service sectors are not correlated with the entry barriers in retail trade. This, in turn, allows
us to rule out the possibility that such indicators are capturing some general characteristic
of the local policy and conclude that the eﬀects we ﬁnd for the retail trade sector are due to
the entry barriers themselves.
6. Conclusions
The lack of competition in the services sector has long been recognized as one of the
structural weaknesses of the Italian economy (Barca & Visco 1992). In this paper, we
have exploited local variation in entry regulation in Italian provinces to study the eﬀects of
entry barriers on economic performance. We ﬁnd that barriers exert a strong inﬂuence on
incumbents’ performance, increasing proﬁt margins and prices, reducing productivity and
ICT investment. Our results indicate that the costs of regulation are substantial.
In terms of future work, we plan to further corroborate our results by instrumenting our
measure of barriers. We believe that our approach controls for the most important sources
of endogeneity; even so, it would be interesting to repeat the exercise with exogenous shifts
in regulation.References
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Table 1: Admissible ﬂoor space. Regional averages.
Regions Pre-reform Total Admissible Post reform
ﬂoor / admissible ﬂoor / max. ﬂoor /
population ﬂoor population population






Molise 135 45,000 137 272
Val d’Aosta 210 14,000 116 326
Sicily 88 532,018 105 193
Trentino Alto Adige 179 82,993 88 267
Lazio 157 363,806 69 225
Puglia 74 31,500 52 126
Liguria 120 76,425 47 167
High barriers
Campania 70 191,374 33 103
Lombardy 246 289,691 32 278
Abruzzo 207 40,000 31 238
Tuscany 178 96,450 27 205
Umbria 249 11,000 21 262
Sardinia 143 28,180 17 160
Veneto 240 676,00 15 255
Calabria 109 26,419 13 122
Basilicata 79 29,874 7 86
Italy 164
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Italian Ministry of Industry and Trade and
Istat. Admissible ﬂoor in square meters. Regions are ranked in decreasing order of admissible ﬂoor
space over population.25
Table 2: Summary statistics
Pre-reform Post-reform Total
Mean St. Err. Mean St. Err. Mean St. Err.
Proﬁt margins
No constraints 0.055 0.010 0.055 0.010 0.055 0.007
Low constraints 0.058 0.005 0.064 0.008 0.062 0.006
High constraints 0.050 0.004 0.071 0.008 0.062 0.005
Total 0.053 0.003 0.066 0.005 0.060 0.006
Real sales / hours worked
No constraints 101.6 9.1 113.4 5.9 109.2 5.1
Low constraints 96.5 5.2 104.6 6.3 102.0 4.6
High constraints 113.1 5.9 119.8 8.4 116.9 5.4
Total 107.1 4.0 113.4 4.7 109.4 5.0
Nominal sales / hours worked
No constraints 109.5 9.1 127.1 6.4 120.9 5.5
Low constraints 102.2 5.4 117.2 6.8 112.4 5.0
High constraints 121.3 6.3 134.9 9.1 129.0 5.8
Total 114.6 4.2 127.4 5.1 120.8 5.4
Prob. of positive ICT expenditure
No constraints 0.633 0.128 0.701 0.062 0.677 0.061
Low constraints 0.500 0.070 0.360 0.061 0.405 0.048
High constraints 0.610 0.069 0.604 0.045 0.607 0.039
Total 0.585 0.049 0.536 0.035 0.563 0.049
ICT expenditure/ sales
No constraints 0.107 0.042 0.065 0.016 0.080 0.019
Low constraints 0.059 0.017 0.047 0.012 0.051 0.010
High constraints 0.062 0.016 0.056 0.010 0.059 0.009
Total 0.068 0.013 0.054 0.007 0.063 0.013
Nominal wages / hours worked
No constraints 10.9 0.4 12.8 0.6 12.1 0.4
Low constraints 11.1 0.4 12.3 0.5 11.9 0.3
High constraints 12.2 0.4 12.6 0.4 12.4 0.3
Total 11.7 0.3 12.5 0.3 12.2 0.3
No. of employees
No constraints 26.7 2.5 31.8 1.6 30.0 1.5
Low constraints 30.9 1.4 28.2 1.4 29.1 1.1
High constraints 29.6 1.7 31.1 1.2 30.5 1.0
Total 29.5 1.2 30.3 0.8 29.9 1.2
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Istat data.26
Table 3: Proﬁt margin regressions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3




High constraints 0.385 *
(0.224)




Employees -0.214 *** -0.217 *** -0.217 ***
(0.081) (0.082) (0.085)
Rsq. 0.133 0.134 0.134
No. Obs. 1,291 1,291 1,291
The dependent variable is the log of gross operating surplus over total sales. Constraints is a
dummy for provinces with no pre-set limits to new ﬂoor space; low (high) constraints is a dummy
for provinces with constraints below (above) the medial level of those with no pre-set limits.
Floor/population and number of employees in logs. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at
the level of the province in brackets. * indicates signiﬁcant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.27
Table 4: Productivity regressions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3




High constraints -0.144 *
(0.084)
AFSP 0.053 ** 0.049 **
(0.026) (0.024)
Init. ﬂoor/pop. 0.067 *
(0.037)
Employees 0.085 * 0.087 * 0.087 *
(0.050) (0.049) (0.050)
Rsq. 0.146 0.144 0.145
No. Obs. 1,576 1,576 1,576
The dependent variable is the log of real sales over hours worked. Constraints is a dummy for
provinces with no pre-set limits to new ﬂoor space; low (high) constraints is a dummy for provinces
with constraints below (above) the medial level of those with no pre-set limits. Floor/population
and number of employees in logs. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the level of the province
in brackets. * indicates signiﬁcant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.28
Table 5: Probability of positive ICT spending regressions
Model 1 Model 2 Molde 3
No constraints 0.268 *** 0.253 ***
(0.060) (.067)
Low constraints -0.268 ***
(0.071)




Init. ﬂoor/pop .113 **
(.044)
Employees 0.155 *** 0.154 *** .157 ***
(0.026) (0.026) (.026)
Pseudo Rsq. 0.081 0.081 0.084
No. Obs. 1,542 1,542 1,542
Probit estimates, marginal eﬀects. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the ﬁrm has
positive ICT spending and 0 otherwise. Constraints is a dummy for provinces with no pre-set limits
to new ﬂoor space; low (high) constraints is a dummy for provinces with constraints below (above)
the medial level of those with no pre-set limits. Floor/population and number of employees in
logs. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the level of the province in brackets. * indicates
signiﬁcant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.29
Table 6: Wage regressions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
No constraints 0.046 0.043
(0.053) (0.052)






Employees 0.100 *** 0.100 *** 0.100 ***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Rsq. 0.233 0.233 0.234
No. Obs. 1,506 1,506 1,506
The dependent variable is the log of total wages paid by ﬁrms over hours worked. Constraints
is a dummy for provinces with no pre-set limits to new ﬂoor space; low (high) constraints is a
dummy for provinces with constraints below (above) the medial level of those with no pre-set
limits. Floor/population and number of employees in logs. Standard errors adjusted for clustering
at the level of the province in brackets. * indicates signiﬁcant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.30
Table 7: Price regressions
Model 1 Model 2
No constraints -0.005
(0.003)







No. Obs. 2,039 2,039
Monthly prices in food and beverages (excluding tobacco) at the regional level. The time period
is 1996-2004. Constraints is a dummy for provinces with no pre-set limits to new ﬂoor space; low
(high) constraints is a dummy for provinces with constraints below (above) the medial level of
those with no pre-set limits. The model also includes monthly dummies and a dummy to control
for diﬀerences in trend before year 2000. Standard errors within brackets. * indicates signiﬁcant
at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.31
Table 8: Proﬁt margin regression, 1993-97









Employees -0.265 *** -0.265 ***
(0.041) (0.040)
Rsq. 0.138 0.138
No. Obs. 9,501 9,501
The dependent variable is the log of gross operating surplus over total sales. Constraints is a
dummy for provinces with no pre-set limits to new ﬂoor space; low (high) constraints is a dummy
for provinces with constraints below (above) the medial level of those with no pre-set limits.
Floor/population and number of employees in logs. The sub-periods are 1993-94 and 1995-97.
Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the level of the province in brackets. * indicates signiﬁc-
a n ta t1 0 % ,* *a t5 %a n d* * *a t1 % .32
Table 9: Productivity regression, 1993-97









Employees 0.054 *** 0.054 ***
(0.021) (0.021)
Rsq. 0.093 0.093
No. Obs. 11,423 11,423
The dependent variable is the log of nominal sales over hours worked. Constraints is a dummy for
provinces with no pre-set limits to new ﬂoor space; low (high) constraints is a dummy for provinces
with constraints below (above) the medial level of those with no pre-set limits. Floor/population
and number of employees in logs. The sub-periods are 1993-94 and 1995-97. Standard errors
adjusted for clustering at the level of the province in brackets. * indicates signiﬁcant at 10%, ** at
5% and *** at 1%.33
Table 10: Proﬁt margins in other service sectors
Hotels Other services
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
No constraints 0.209 -0.270
(0.143) (0.274)
Low constraints -0.077 0.180
(0.077) (0.154)




Employees -0.201 *** -0.200 *** -0.145 ** -0.145 **
(0.055) (0.055) (0.067) (0.067)
Rsq. 0.293 0.293 0.133 0.133
No. Obs. 1,140 1,140 1,218 1,218
The dependent variable is the log of gross operating surplus over total sales. Constraints is a
dummy for provinces with no pre-set limits to new ﬂoor space; low (high) constraints is a dummy
for provinces with constraints below (above) the medial level of those with no pre-set limits.
Floor/population and number of employees in logs. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at
the level of the province in brackets. * indicates signiﬁcant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.34
Table 11: Productivity in other service sectors
Hotels Other services
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
No constraints 0.030 -0.166
(0.120) (0.101)
Low constraints -0.067 0.103
(0.094) (0.064)




Employees -0.026 -0.026 0.002 0.002
(0.024) (0.024) (0.033) (0.033)
Rsq. 0.272 0.272 0.245 0.245
No. Obs. 1,140 1,140 1,398 1,398
The dependent variable is the log of value added over hours worked. Constraints is a dummy for
provinces with no pre-set limits to new ﬂoor space; low (high) constraints is a dummy for provinces
with constraints below (above) the medial level of those with pre-set limits. Floor/population and
number of employees in logs. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the level of the province in
brackets. * indicates signiﬁcant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.35
Figure 1: New admissible floor space over population in Italian provinces36
Figure 2: Total admissible floor space over population in Italian provinces37
Figure 3: Consumer price index for food and beverages
The figure reports the estimate of the year dummies for regions with low and high constraints
in deviation from the no constraint ones for the price regressions of Table 7. * indicates
significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.38
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